CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 16 August 1961

MEMORANDUM

THE SITUATION IN STANLEYVILLE

Premier Cyrille Adoula's impending visit to Antoine Gizenga (he is scheduled to go today) should clarify the Stanleyville leader's role. Gizenga, who currently appears to be in a greatly weakened position, has hinged his acceptance of the vice premier's post on Adoula's agreement to name a Gizengist—such as Pierre Mulele—as minister of defense. He also has demanded that the capital be moved from Leopoldville and has suggested Kamina, Luluabourg or Stanleyville as alternative sites. Many of Gizenga's former supporters, now in Leopoldville, have criticized his unwillingness to come to the capital. Although some twelve of the twenty-seven members of the cabinet have had association with Lumumba's political party or allied groups, many at this time do not appear subject to Gizenga's manipulation from Stanleyville.

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	Gizenga	has	made	several	feelers	to	Leopoldville,	
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Gizenga reportedly still wants a reconciliation with the other factors but fears that he will be arrested or killed if he goes to Leopoldville and has little confidence in his Leopoldville colleagues.

Within his Stanleyville stronghold, Gizenga's power probably rests on the continued support of General Lundula who commands a relatively disciplined army group numbering several thousand. Lundula, who is reported to have considerable respect for legality and the actions of the Congolese parliament, will probably act to prevent any violence on the part of extremists against Premier Adoula and may switch sides if Gizenga abuses the Congo's legally elected leader. Apart from Lundula, Gizenga has little popular or political support; former ministers of his government such as Gbenye are in Leopoldville, and leaders of the Orientale Provincial government remain hostile but powerless in relation to Gizenga.

If Gizenga does not agree to participate actively in the Adoula government, the recent pattern of growing diplomatic support on the part of the bloc and radical African states and of intensified efforts to establish a supply route to Stanleyville, suggests that a Communist-influenced enclave based on Stanleyville will pose a major problem for the Adoula government. African and bloc diplomats are not likely to abandon Stanleyville quickly if Gizenga refuses to enter the Adoula regime—particularly if propagandists can attack Adoula's good faith in refusing to

carry out an alleged bargain whereby Gizenga claims to have been promised the ministry of defense.

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